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Abstract 
This paper examines whether the current EU competition law regarding refusal to license intellectual 
property rights can effectively deal with access to industry common standards that may embrace 
proprietary intellectual property rights. It finds even though intellectual property rights as such do not 
confer dominant position to their owners in the market, industry standards that embrace technologies 
covered by IPRs may add substantial value to these IPRs. The combination of industry standards and 
IPRs may create a dominant position in the market. The paper suggests that the approach based on the 
complementary interaction between intellectual property law and competition law be introduced to 
address the refusal to license IPRs problems in terms of industry standards, especially the over-
exploiting intellectual property should be taken into account when to determine the existence of abuse 
of dominant position. 
1. Introduction 
Technical standards 1  have been generally applied to secure quality, safety or 
interoperability of products or services in the modern industry. The implementation of 
industry common standards may however raise concerns for licensing of intellectual 
property rights (IPRs) because technical standards as a kind of technological 
specification may cover some claims of others’ patents and some codes of others’ 
software. This has resulted in insuperable problems especially in the information and 
communication technology (ICT) industry. In the ICT industry, on the one hand, 
technologies have been generally standardized in order to secure compatibility and 
interoperability between different networks and many components; on the other hands, 
technologies are fragmented into many separate exclusive areas by owning patents or 
other IPRs by many different firms, this phenomenon is called “patent thicket” or 
                                               
1 According to the International Standard Organization (ISO) definition, standards are documented 
agreements containing technical specifications or other precise criteria to be used consistently as rules, 
guidelines, or definitions of characteristics, to ensure that materials, products, processes and services 
are fit for their purpose. (ISO 2002)  
Quality and safety standards define the design or performance characteristics that products must have 
either to be sold in the market or to obtain “approval,” “certification,” or “listing” by a standard-setting 
body. Interoperability standards specify whether and how one type of product will be able to fit or 
communicate with other products. See James J. Anton and Dennis A. Yao, “Standard-Setting Consortia, 
Antitrust, and High-Technology Industries,” Antitrust L J 64 (1995), 247, 248, 262-63.  
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“patent minefield” 2 . Obviously it is very unlikely for a ICT standard to avoid 
including any proprietary technologies. As a result, when a firm attempts to develop a 
product or service pursuant to an industry standard, it inevitably infringes IPRs of 
others that are essential to the standard. To spare the standard implementers from 
infringement, license of using these IPRs is needed. Nevertheless, owners of these 
IPRs may refuse to grant a license, thereby blocking the access to a standard so as to 
exclude their competitors from entering the market, specifically leading to “patent 
hold-up” problems. Since such behaviors may distort or prevent competition in the 
Common market, there are openings to apply competition rules to refusal to license 
IPRs.  
This paper attempts to examine how European competition law, specifically the 
Article 82 of EC Treaty can effectively address the refusal to license IPRs in ICT 
standardization context. The first part of this article discusses how technical standards 
may add substantial value to an intellectual property thereby creating a market power. 
The second looks into how the European courts have dealt with issues regarding 
refusal to license IPRs. The third part demonstrates the inefficiency of applying the 
current European case law to refusal to license IPRs in ICT standardization context. 
Finally, a solution to such inefficiency in light of the complementary interaction 
between intellectual property law and competition law will close the analysis.  
2. Technical standards and market power   
2.1. Intellectual property rights itself do not confer market power 
Market power offers a helpful preliminary filter to identify the sources of competition 
problems.3 As a kind of statutory monopoly for limited period granted by national law, 
however, IPRs cannot automatically be regarded as owning market power under 
Article 82 EC. Whether or not an IPR holder would have market power in terms of 
the IPR depends not on the exclusive rights pe se, but on the existence of a substitute 
for the technology covered by the IPRs, because a technology, which is protected by 
IPR, despite novel and valuable, may have a corresponding substitute. Hence, the 
European Court of Justice (ECJ) has consistently held that the ownership of 
                                               
2 Carl Shapiro, “Navigating the Patent Thicket: Cross Licensing, Patent Pools, and Standard Setting,” 
in Innovation Policy and the Economy (Adam Jaffe et al., eds., Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, 2001), 
2001. 
3 Giorgio Monti, EC Competition Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 124. 
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intellectual property did not necessarily mean that the owner had a dominant 
position.4  
2.2. Standard setting may add value to a technology 
A de facto standard arises from uncoordinated processes in the competitive 
marketplace, therefore it usually has been commonly accepted by the market. A de 
jure standard usually is developed by a standards-setting consortium, participants of 
which might have a bigger market share individually or totally. Since standard-setting 
activities often involve testing, broad discussion and comparative evaluation of 
competing technologies, the technology that has been chosen to incorporate into a 
standard may gain credibility and it is likely to convey favorable information to the 
market about the quality and compatibility of the technology chosen, resulting in a 
competitive advantage over alternative technologies.5 Therefore it is more likely to be 
widely accepted than alternative technologies.  
Furthermore, many benefits strongly attract market players to implement standardized 
technologies. First, implementing a standardized technology can reduce the risk of 
being incompatible and inoperable with other systems; second, implementers can take 
advantage of plentiful complementary products and services that have already existed 
in the market. Moreover, when a technology with close substitutes wins in a standard-
setting competition, it becomes distinguished from its formerly equivalent substitutes, 
and other close substitutes accordingly become inferior. This situation may increase 
the royalty rate a technology can command. 6  Consequently standardization may 
significantly enhance the value of a technology that has been embraced in a standard.  
2.3. The combination of intellectual property rights and industry standards 
may create dominance  
                                               
4 Case 238/87 AB Volvo v. Erik Veng (UK) Ltd [1988] ECR 6211 [1988] ECR 6211; Case 53/87 
CICCRA Maxicar v. Renault [1988] ECR 6039 [1988] ECR 6039; Cases 241 & 242/91 RTE & ITP v. 
Commission [1995] ECR 743 [1995] ECR I-743; Case 418/01 IMS Health v. NDC, [2004] ECR I-5039 
[2004]ECR 5039. 
5 Daniel G. Swanson and William J. Baumol, “Reasonable and Nondiscriminatory (Rand) Royalties, 
Standards Selection, and Control of Market Power,” Antitrust Law Journal 73 (2005-2006), 8.  
6  Gregory K. Leonard; Lauren J. Stiroh, Economic Approaches to Intellectual Property Policy, 
Litigation, and Management (NERA Economic Consulting, 2005), 223. 
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Although none should infer market power from the existence of intellectual property 
or standard-setting alone, the ECJ held, in United Brands and Hoffmann-La Roche, 
that a dominant position may derive from a combination of several factors which, 
taken separately, were not necessarily determinative.7 Accordingly, the combination 
of IPRs with a technical standard does not imply abuse, but may establish dominance 
under certain environment where none might otherwise exist alone.  
To ascertain whether or not a substitute to a prevalent standardized technology exists, 
it is necessary to look at both supply and demand side issues because despite 
existence of competing technologies, users, for example, be locked into a standardized 
technology and they are impossible to switch to a competing technology.8 When a 
technical standard has been adopted by mainstream firms, thereby becoming prevalent 
in the market, on the one hand, the network effect9 will attract more latecomers into 
adopting the same standard; on the other hand, the network effect may cause high 
switching costs for standard implementers and consumers. During the standard 
implementing, an implementer incur investment costs that finally become a switching 
cost because most of equipments, software etc. that it has invested on to implement a 
standard, are unable to operate with any other technologies that are incompatible with 
the current standard. If it were to switch to an incompatible technology, most of its 
early investment would become sink costs. When such costs are substantial, switching 
to an alternative technology becomes virtually impossible. Moreover, not only does 
an implemented standard lock in the current implementers, but also it can determine 
the future evolution of a technology because subsequent technologies have to be 
compatible with the current prevalent technology.10 From the supply aspect of market 
structure, the lock-in effect of standards may considerably strengthen the position of 
owners of technology embraced in an industry standard in the market: any alternative 
technology, even superior is not able to be viable in the market. In addition, before an 
                                               
7 Case C-27/76, United Brands v. Commission of the European Communities, [1978] ECR 207, para. 
66; Case 85/76, Hoffmann-La Roche v. Commission, [1979] ECR 541, para. 39. 
8 Case C-322/81, Nederlandsche Banden-lndustrie Michelin NV v. Commission [1983] ECR 3461, para. 
37; Case C-333/94 P, Tetra Pak International SA v. Commission [1996] ECRI- 5951, para. 13. 
9 Direct network effects are present when the demand for a good depends on how many other people 
purchase it. Indirect network effects work through complementary products: the level of overall 
consumption of the product in question affects the availability of complementary products. See 
Hemphill and Vonortas, U.S. Antitrust Policy, Interface Compatibility Standards, and Information 
Technology, 133.  
10 As Tassey indicated, technology standards affect further technological change and innovation. See 
Gregory Tassey, “Standardization in Technology-Based Markets,” Research Policy 29 (2000), 597.  
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industry standard is chosen, a variety of alternative technologies could be available. 
Once industry participants choose a technology as a standard and take steps to 
implement it, alternative technologies become less attractive, and may even 
disappear.11 Therefore when an IPR is essential to a standard, to which a product or 
service much relies on being compliant to remain viable in the market, owners of such 
IPRs are able to control the access to standard, thereby attaining a dominant position 
in the market.  
2.4. The dominant position might be abused 
The ICT are progressing very quickly and innovation in the ICT usually occurs as a 
process of “creative destruction”12, in which new technologies evolve on the ruins of 
their technological predecessors. Thus, it is substantial for the incumbents who hold 
the essential IPRs in prevalent standards to steer the innovation and evolution of 
technologies, partly by innovating faster itself (positive effect) but also partly by 
trying to thwart innovation by others to protect the dominant position (negative 
effect).13 The usual way to do so is to ambush competitors with IPRs or refuse license 
of IPRs. Without obtaining the license of using essential IPRs, competitor’s product 
or service, despite having superior technological features, are not possible to be 
compliant with industry standard, therefore will be excluded from the market.  
In the case of IPR ambush, when a firm has made irreversible investments in 
implementing a standard without realizing the existence of IPRs, the proprietor of 
those IPRs which are essential to the standard could demand a high royalty well 
beyond the intellectual property’s intrinsic value. The implementer would be willing 
to pay this high rate if it allowed it to avoid the cost of switching to another 
technology—at least up to the point where the royalty equal the cost of moving to the 
next best alternative.14  
                                               
11 See Joseph Farrell and others, “Standard Setting, Patents, and Hold-Up,” Antitrust Law Journal 74 
(2007), 603-607; Damien Geradin and Anne Layne-Farrar, “The Logic and Limits of Ex Ante 
Competition in a Standard-Setting Environment,” Competition Policy International 3 (2007), 81, 82.  
12 Joseph A. Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy, 3rd ed. (Harper Perennial, 1962), 81-
85. 
13  Thomas A. Hemphill and Nicholas S. Vonortas, “U.S. Antitrust Policy, Interface Compatibility 
Standards, and Information Technology,” Knowledge, Technology & Policy 18 (2005): 134. 
14 Geradin and Layne-Farrar, The Logic and Limits of Ex Ante Competition in a Standard-Setting 
Environment, 79-106.  
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In dealing with the IPR hold-up and ambush problems, some standard-setting 
organizations have introduced their IPR policies that request members to disclose 
their essential IPRs and to grant the license on fair and reasonable and 
nondiscriminatory terms. However, not every standard-setting organization has made 
such policy; de facto standards are not subject to such restrictions since they are not 
made by a standard-setting organization; and in the recent Rambus decision15 the U.S 
court shows reluctance to enforce such a standard-setting organization’s IPR policy. 
Thus, in this circumstance, in tackling IPR hold-up and ambush problems, 
competition law still have to be relied on.  
3. The EU approach dealing with refusal to license IPRs 
Article 82 of the EC Treaty prohibits the abuse by one or more firms of a dominant 
position within the Common Market or a substantial part of it to the extent that it may 
affect trade between the Member States. In standardization context, as discussed 
above, refusal to license essential IPRs may unreasonably distort competition and 
stifle innovation in the market. Therefore, there are openings for competition law to 
apply. 
3.1. Overview of European court cases concerning refusal to license IPRs 
The European courts have developed an approach to clarify in what circumstances 
and under what conditions refusal to license technology may constitute abuse within 
the meaning of Article 82.  
3.1.1. AB Volvo and CICCRA case 
In AB Volvo v. Erik Veng and CICCRA v. Renault, 16  the car manufactures owned 
design rights covering car body panels. They refused to license independent parts 
producers to imitate and trade products incorporating the protected design. In its 
judgment, the ECJ held that a refusal to license was not an abuse per se, but might 
become so in certain circumstances. The Court firstly affirmed that the right of a 
proprietor of a protected design to prevent third parties from manufacturing and 
selling or importing, without his consent, products incorporating the design 
                                               
15 Rambus Inc. v. F.T.C. 522 F.3d 456 C.A.D.C., 2008. 
16 Case 238/87 AB Volvo v. Erik Veng (UK) Ltd [1988] ECR 6211; Case 53/87 CICCRA Maxicar v. 
Renault [1988] ECR 6039. 
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constitutes the very subject-matter of his exclusive right. Then the Court added that 
“an obligation imposed upon the proprietor of a protected design to grant to third 
parties, even in return for a reasonable royalty, a licence for the supply of products 
incorporating the design would lead to the proprietor thereof being deprived of the 
substance of his exclusive right, and that a refusal to grant such a licence cannot in 
itself constitute an abuse of a dominant position”.17 The Court noted, however, that 
the refusal to licence IPR in this case may be prohibited by Article 82 EC “if it 
involves on the part of an undertaking holding a dominant position, certain abusive 
conduct …… provided that such conduct is liable to affect trade between Member 
States”.18 
3.1.2. Magill case 
In Magill,19  the programs of three television companies—RTE, ITV and BBC—
covered the most households in Ireland and 30% to 40% of the households in 
Northern Ireland. However, no comprehensive weekly television guide for these 
programs was available in Ireland and Northern Ireland market. Magill attempted to 
publish a comprehensive weekly television guide but was prevented from doing so by 
the RTE, ITP (ITV’s affiliate) and BBC, because under Irish and United Kingdom 
legislation, TV program listings are protected by copyright. The ECJ firstly affirmed 
the “refusal to license not per se an abuse” principle stated in AB Volvo. 20 
Nevertheless, the Court held that the exercise of an exclusive right by the proprietor 
might, in exceptional circumstances, involve abusive conduct. 21  Then, the Court 
identified the following exceptional circumstances in the decision: the listing 
information was indispensable to Magill to publish a TV guide covering all channels; 
the refusal prevented the appearance of a new product, namely a comprehensive TV 
guide, for which there was a potential consumer demand; 22the dominant firm reserved 
to themselves the secondary market of weekly TV guides by excluding all 
                                               
17 Case 238/87 AB Volvo v. Erik Veng (UK) Ltd [1988] ECR 6211, para. 8. 
18 Ibid., para. 9. 
19Cases 241 & 242/91 RTE & ITP v. Commission [1995] ECR 743.  
20 Ibid., para. 46-49. 
21 Ibid., para. 50. 
22 Ibid., para. 54. 
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competition on that market; 23 and finally, there was no objective justification for such 
refusal. 24 
3.1.3. Oscar Bronner case 
In subsequent Oscar Bronner,25   Mediaprint held a very large share of the daily 
newspaper market in Austria and operated the only nationwide newspaper home-
delivery scheme in Austria. Its competitor, Oscar Bronner, wanted Mediaprint to 
include its newspaper in the delivery scheme in return for reasonable remuneration, 
but Mediaprint refused to do so. Oscar Bronner asserted that considering its small 
circulation it was unable either alone or in cooperation with other publishers to set up 
and operate its own home-delivery scheme in economically reasonable conditions. 
This case does not involve licensing intellectual property right, but the decision 
reaffirmed and clarified the principles in Magill 26  and defined the meaning of 
“indispensable”. The Court held that there would be an abuse where: 1) the refusal is 
likely to eliminate all competition in the daily newspaper market on the part of the 
person requesting the service; 2) the service in itself should be indispensable in 
carrying on that person’s business, inasmuch as there is no actual or potential 
substitute in existence for the home-delivery scheme, and 3) such refusal should be 
incapable of being objectively justified.27  
3.1.4. IMS Health case 
In IMS Health,28 IMS Health collected and provided data on the regional sales of 
pharmaceutical products in Germany to pharmaceutical companies and practitioners. 
IMS Health had developed a data analysis structure for pharmaceutical sales in 
Germany, the so-called “1860 brick structure”. IMS Health distributed its brick 
structures free of charge to pharmacies and doctors’ surgeries, and this practice helped 
the IMS 1860 brick structure becoming a de facto industry standard for 
pharmaceutical data presentation in Germany. Its competitor, NDC, engaged in 
marketing regional data of pharmaceutical products in Germany formatted on the 
                                               
23 Ibid., para. 56. 
24 Ibid., para. 57. 
25 Case 7/97, Oscar Bronner v. Mediaprint [1998] ECR 1-7791. 
26 Ibid., para. 40. 
27 Ibid., para. 41. 
28 Case 418/01 IMS Health v. NDC, [2004] ECR I-5039.  
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basis of brick structure that is very similar to the IMS 1860 brick structure. However, 
IMS Health attempted to prohibit NDC from using these structures because the 1860 
brick structure was allegedly protected by copyright.  
The ECJ, based on Magill and Oscar Bronner, identified a four-prong test to 
determine the existence of abuse regarding the refusal to license IPRs: 1)the product 
and service covered by IPRs was indispensable for carrying on a particular business 
[operating on a secondary market]; 2)the refusal was preventing the emergence of a 
new product for which there was a potential consumer demand; 3)the refusal could 
not be objectively justified; 4)the refusal was of such a kind as to exclude any/all 
effective competition on a secondary market. 29 
3.1.5. Microsoft case 
In recent Microsoft case30 , the Court of First Instance (“CFI”) clarified how the 
exceptional circumstances identified in Magill and IMS Health should be examined.  
Microsoft had over 90% market shares in the PC operating system market, and its PC 
operating system had become a de facto industry standard. Sun Microsystems was 
competing with Microsoft in the workgroup server operating systems market. Since 
workgroup server operating systems and PC operating systems working in a network 
have to interoperate with each other, consumers to buy workgroup server operating 
systems naturally want them being compatible with the prevalent PC operating 
systems: namely Microsoft Windows PC operating systems and its other application 
products. To secure interoperability of its workgroup server operating systems with 
Microsoft PC operating systems, Sun Microsystems requested Microsoft to provide 
“interoperability information” and to authorize the use of that information for the 
purpose of developing and distributing products competing with Microsoft’s own 
products on the workgroup server operating systems market, but Microsoft refused. 
Sun Microsoft lodged a complaint with the European Commission, and the 
Commission held that Microsoft had abused its dominant position on the PC 
operating systems market. Microsoft appealed to the CFI. 
                                               
29 Ibid., para. 38,52.. 
30 Case T-201/04, Microsoft v. Commission, September 17, 2007. 
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Microsoft argued that the circumstances in reference to abusive conduct must be 
assessed in the light of the criteria recognised in Magill, and reiterated in IMS 
Health,31 and claimed that none of the four criteria of IMS Health, and, consequently, 
none of the three criteria of Bronner, was satisfied in this case.32 The Commission 
claimed that IMS Health did not establish an exhaustive list of exceptional 
circumstances,33 therefore, in order to determine whether such a refusal was abusive, 
it had to take into account all the particular circumstances surrounding that refusal, 
which needed not necessarily be the same as those identified in Magill and IMS 
Health.34  The Court ruled that it was appropriate, first of all, to decide whether the 
circumstances identified in Magill and IMS Health were also present in this case; only 
if it found that one or more of those circumstances were absent, would the Court 
proceed to assess the particular circumstances invoked by the Commission.35 
Microsoft asserted that the interoperability information required by the competitors 
was not indispensable to the activity of suppliers of workgroup server operating 
systems.36 However, the Court upheld the Commission’s finding that non-Microsoft 
workgroup server operating systems must be capable of interoperating with the 
Windows client PCs as the same compatibility as Windows workgroup server 
operating systems if they were to be viably stay on the market, 37  and none of 
Microsoft recommended other methods or solutions made it possible to achieve such 
degree of interoperability.38 Thus, the Court confirmed the finding of the Commission 
that the interoperability information was indispensable.39  
Microsoft argued that the refusal at issue was not such as to exclude all competition 
on a secondary market (the workgroup server operating systems market).40 The CFI 
clarified that Article 82 EC did not apply only from the time when there was no more, 
or practically no more, competition on the market,41 indeed what matters was that the 
                                               
31 Ibid., para. 291. 
32 Ibid., para. 300. 
33 Ibid., para. 303. 
34 Ibid., para. 316. 
35 Ibid., para. 336. 
36 Ibid., para. 337. 
37 Ibid., para. 421. 
38 Ibid., para. 435. 
39 Ibid., para. 436. 
40 Ibid., para. 437. 
41 Ibid., para. 561. 
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refusal at issue was liable to, or was likely to, eliminate all effective competition on 
the market, moreover the fact that the competitors of the dominant firm retained a 
marginal presence in certain niches on the market could not suffice to substantiate the 
existence of such competition.42 The Court therefore concluded that the circumstance 
that the refusal at issue entailed the risk of elimination of competition was present in 
this case.43 
Microsoft cited the paragraphs 48 and 49 of IMS Health, and maintained that its 
refusal did not prevent the appearance of a new product for which there was 
unsatisfied consumer demand, because its competitors just wanted to make their 
products behave in exactly the same way as Windows server operating systems, and 
the interoperability information would be used by its competitors to create server 
operating systems that competed directly with its products by imitating their 
functionality. 44 In addressing this question, the Court referred to Article 82(b) EC, 
which prohibits abusive practices that include “limiting production, markets or 
technical developments to the …prejudice of consumers”.45 Then the Court indicated 
that “the circumstance relating to the appearance of a new product, as envisaged in 
Magill and IMS Health cannot be the only parameter which determines whether a 
refusal to license an intellectual property right is capable of causing prejudice to 
consumers within the meaning of Article 82(b) EC. As that provision states, such 
prejudice may arise where there is a limitation not only of production or markets, but 
also of technical development”.46 Then the Court upheld the Commission’s finding 
that the Microsoft’s refusal limited technical development to the prejudice of 
consumers within the meaning of Article 82(b) EC.47 
In addition, Microsoft provided justifications for the refusal that the technology 
concerned was covered by IPRs for which it has made significant investment, and if it 
was required to grant third parties access to the technology, this would eliminate 
future incentives to invest in the creation of more intellectual property.48 The Court 
responded that the technology being covered by IPRs could not itself constitute 
                                               
42 Ibid., para. 563.. 
43 Ibid., para. 620.. 
44 Ibid., para. 623.. 
45 Ibid., para. 643. 
46 Ibid., para. 647. 
47 Ibid., para. 648-665. 
48 Ibid., para. 666-689. 
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objective justification within the meaning of Magill and IMS Health,49 and Microsoft 
did not demonstrate that the future incentive to invest in innovation would be 
eliminated.50 
Finally, the Court confirmed that the exceptional circumstances identified in Magill 
and IMS Health were also present in this case.51  
3.2. Brief remarks 
The ECJ frequently emphasized that refusal to grant license of IPRs cannot in itself 
constitute an abuse of dominant position, and it only can be found in exceptional 
circumstances. The Court referred to Article 82 (b) EC, and formulating a cumulative 
four prong test based on consumer interest to figure out the existence of the 
exceptional circumstances. However, this test derives from a very special case, 
namely the Magill, which involved an extremely narrow intellectual property right, 
namely the copyright of TV-listing, which also involved leveraging of sole source 
information. When the Court tried to generalize this test and applied it to various 
refusal to license cases, it inevitably caused some problems. 
4. Applying the current approach to refusal to license IPRs in standardization 
context: problems and solutions 
4.1. The requirement of distinguishing secondary market 
This section finds that the requirement of distinguishing two markets in most cases is 
either unnecessary or inappropriate to solve the refusal to license IPRs, especially in 
standardization context.  
In IMS Health, in order to assess whether the refusal to grant access to a product or a 
service indispensable for carrying on a particular business activity was an abuse, the 
ECJ distinguished an upstream market and a downstream (secondary) market.52 The 
Court held it was determinative that two different stages of production may be 
identified and they were interconnected, inasmuch as the upstream product was 
                                               
49 Ibid., para. 690. 
50 Ibid., para. 701. 
51 Ibid., para. 712. 
52 Case 418/01 IMS Health v. NDC, [2004] ECR I-5039, para. 42. 
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indispensable for the supply of the downstream product,53 and it was sufficient if a 
“potential market or even hypothetical” market could be identified.54 In other words, 
it is not necessary for there to have been prior supply of the IPR in question on an 
open market; potential supply and potential demand would be sufficient.55 As a result, 
any IPRs as such, despite the fact that they solely have been designed to improve a 
product or service and are not for independently marketing, may be identified as in a 
upstream market, because a product that embodies an IPR may be considered as in a 
downstream market and the IPR in a secondary.  Consequently, for example, in terms 
of any patents, two markets always can be identified: the patent licensing market and 
the market of providing the product that embodies the patent. As a result, any such 
finding would make it difficult for the IPR owner not to have a dominant position.56 
In Philips v. Ingman—an English case, Philips owned patents on compact disc 
technology and asserted them in an infringement action in UK court against Ingman, a 
CD manufacturer who had declined to accept Philips standard licensing terms, offered 
by Philips pursuant to its obligations under a Philips/Sony patent pooling arrangement. 
The judge criticized that, “it can be said that the defendants’ pleading does not assert 
directly that the plaintiff’s patents give rise to a per se dominant position. Instead it 
alleges that the plaintiff owns a dominant position in the market for licensing the 
patented technology. But it seems to me that this is a matter of semantics only. 
Whenever an IPR exists there is a correlative potential market in licenses to exploit it. 
It is the ability to grant or refuse such licenses which constitutes the right in the first 
place. This is only an alternative way of saying that the proprietor owns exclusive 
rights which he can exploit, if he wishes, by licensing.” 57 
The requirement of distinguishing secondary market in refusal to license IPR cases 
originated from Magill, which referred to Commercial Solvents v. Commission that 
involves refusal to supply tangible goods thereby to leverage a dominant position into 
a downstream market.58  Nonetheless, in terms of distinguishing upstream market, 
there is a significant difference between intellectual property and tangible goods. 
                                               
53 Ibid., para. 45. 
54 Ibid., para. 44. 
55 Jonathan Faull and Ali Nikpay, The EC Law of Competition, 2nd ed. (Oxford University Press, USA, 
2007), 1094. 
56 Guy Tritton, Intellectual Property in Europe, 3rd ed. (Sweet & Maxwell, 2007), 1017. 
57 Phillips Electronics v. Ingman Ltd [1999] FSR 112,[1998] 2 C.M.L.R. 839, para. 53. 
58 Cases 241 & 242/91 RTE & ITP v. Commission [1995] ECR 743, para. 56, 57; Cases 6/73 and 7/73, 
ICI and Commercial Solvents v. Commission, [1974] ECR 223, [1974] 1 CMLR 309. 
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Manufacturers of tangible goods naturally would like to sell goods as much as they 
can to maximize profit. If one refuses to sell its goods, it would sound suspicious why 
one in business to make money refuses to sell its product to someone who is willing to 
pay for it. However, in terms of IPRs, the situation may be different. The owner of 
intellectual property may just invent technology to develop and improve its tangible 
products, which will be added some competitive advantage over its competitors’ by 
the technology. The technology may not be invented for the purpose to sell or license 
to others. Artificially identifying intellectual property pe se as an input for the 
downstream market could result in that a firm’s important competitive advantage has 
to be shared with a number of competitors, therefore leave little scope for competition 
in added value. 59  Clearly, the scenarios of distinguishing downstream market for 
intellectual property and for tangible goods are completely different.  
Moreover, the refusal to license IPR cases have involved different scenarios. In Volvo 
the court did not distinguish a secondary market to affirm abuse; in Magill and IMS 
Health, the court identified the IP licensing market as an upstream market, and the 
market that the IP is commercialized as the secondary market. In Microsoft, indeed it 
involves three markets: the IP licensing market, the PC operating system market, the 
workgroup server operating system market. Obviously, these are different situations. 
This shows that the distinguishing upstream and downstream market in refusal to 
license IPR cases is not always consistent. 
Commentators even pointed out that the two market requirement is not useful in 
determining compulsory license IPR case from systematical analysis.60 According to 
them, Article 82 (b) EC rather intends to focus on consumer prejudice in the main 
market where the IPR is excised. Systematically, while a consumer prejudice should 
not be a necessary condition of an abuse in the leveraging case—such as Bronner or 
Commercial Solvents—where two markets are concerned, where to address 
leveraging between two markets, the existence of two markets is absolutely necessary 
for this kind of case. However, the condition of “preventing the emergence of a new 
                                               
59  John Temple Lang, “Compulsory Licensing of Intellectual Property in European Community 
Antitrust Law,” http://www.ftc.gov/opp/intellect/020522langdoc.pdf (accessed May, 2008). 
60 Matthias Leistner, “Intellectual Property and Competition Law: The European Development from 
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product” might be one indicator for another kind of abuse, which focuses on the harm 
to consumers. To require both of these criteria cumulatively, such as in IMS Health, 
means to mix up two entirely different strands of reasoning. 61 
Since almost all IPRs can fulfill this requirement, the artificially distinguishing 
intellectual property licensing market as an upstream market does not do any help to 
solve the problem. Therefore other conditions have to be relied on to determine the 
existence of abuse concerning refusal to license IPRs.  
4.2. Indispensability assess and lock-in effect 
Oscar Bronner established the criterion for testing the indispensability, namely, the 
input in itself should be indispensable in carrying on that person’s business, inasmuch 
as there is no actual or potential substitute in existence for it, and there are no any 
technical, legal or even economic obstacles capable of making it impossible, or even 
unreasonably difficult.62 In Microsoft, the court confirmed the Commission’s finding 
that Microsoft’s interoperability information was indispensible. The Commission 
examined firstly what degree of interoperability with the Windows domain 
architecture non-Microsoft workgroup server operating systems must achieve in order 
for its competitors to be able to remain viably on the market and, then, it appraised 
whether the interoperability information that Microsoft refused to disclose was 
indispensable to the attainment of that degree of interoperability.63 The Court found 
that the absence of such interoperability with the Microsoft Windows domain 
architecture had the effect of reinforcing Microsoft’s competitive position on the 
workgroup server operating systems market, particularly because it induced 
consumers to use Microsoft workgroup server operating system in preference to its 
competitors’, although these competitors’ offer features to which consumers attach 
great importance.64 Clearly, in Microsoft, the lock-in effect is a major obstacle that 
prevents potential consumers from switching to a substitute technology despite having 
superior technical features.  
                                               
61 Leistner, “Intellectual Property and Competition Law: The European Development from Magill to 
IMS Health compared to recent German and US Case Law,” 150-151; Heinemann, “Compulsory 
Licences and Product Integration in European Competition Law--Assessment of the European 
Commission's Microsoft Decision,” 73. 
62 Case 7/97, Oscar Bronner v. Mediaprint [1998] ECR 1-7791, para. 44. 
63 Case T-201/04, Microsoft v. Commission, September 17, 2007, para. 369. 
64 Ibid., para. 422. 
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In terms of accessing to a standardized technology, the IPR at issue may not be 
technically indispensable; rather it can be economic indispensable for competitors to 
remaining viable in the market since even though an alternative technology is 
available as a substitute to the IPR at issue, it is not accepted by the market due to 
lock-in effect and high switching cost, as has been demonstrated in Section 2. The 
“economic obstacles” may become the major elements that make IPR indispensable 
for competitors to being viable in the market.  
The newly published the Commission’s guidance on the Commission's enforcement 
priorities in applying Article 82 of the EC to abusive exclusionary conduct by 
dominant firms states that in assessing the indispensability “the Commission will 
normally make an assessment of whether competitors could effectively duplicate the 
input produced by the dominant undertaking in the foreseeable future. The notion of 
duplication means the creation of an alternative source of efficient supply that is 
capable of allowing competitors to exert a competitive constraint on the dominant 
undertaking in the downstream market.” 65  Based on the previous analysis, in 
assessing competitors’ ability to create “alternative source of efficient supply” in the 
cases involving access to a technical standard, standard lock-in effect and high 
switching cost excluding alternative technology have to be taken into consideration.  
4.3. Prevention of the appearance of a new product 
4.3.1. New product requirement and essential facilities doctrine 
The Magill, IMS Health seems to create a limited obligation on a proprietor of IPR to 
grant licenses of that IPR, where a licensee needs IPR to create a new product for 
which there is potential demand. If not for this additional requirement (the new 
product), IMS Health would be considered an application of essential facilities 
doctrine, which has been applied to physical facilities.66 The central idea of “essential 
facility” is that a dominant firm in control of a facility that is essential to other 
competitors must provide reasonable access to that facility if it is feasible to do so,67 
                                               
65 The Commission, “Guidance on the Commission's enforcement priorities in applying Article 82 of 
the EC Treaty to abusive exclusionary conduct by dominant undertakings,” February 9, 2009, para. 83. 
66  Tritton, Intellectual Property in Europe, 1059; Heinemann, “Compulsory Licences and Product 
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Decision,” 71. 
67 Lipsky, Jr. Abbott B. and J. Gregory Sidak, “Essential Facilities,” Stanford Law Review 51 (1999), 
1190-1191.  
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—traditionally, the essential facility doctrine has applied to harbors, airports, 
computerized airline ticket systems, and telecommunications networks etc.68 Some 
commentators have suggested applying the essential facilities doctrine to intellectual 
property.69 However, simply applying the doctrine which has been applied to tangible 
facilities to intellectual property could cause more problems that it intends to solve. 
These cases discussed in section 3 have shown that the EU legal practice has not 
simply applied essential facilities doctrine to intellectual property; it rather applied 
essential facility doctrine plus the new product/technical development requirement to 
compulsory access to intellectual property cases. The CFI also noted that such a new 
product requirement was found only in the case-law on the exercise of an intellectual 
property right.70 Hence the new product requirement has played a significant role to 
restrain the application of compulsory license to be in accord with the AB Volvo 
decision, which restricted compulsory licensing IPR only in exceptional 
circumstances. However, the new product requirement does not solve refusal to 
license IPR problem completely. 
In standardization context, consumers may not need a new product, but instead a 
comparable product. In IMS Health, the IMS 1860 brick structure has become a de 
facto industry standard. It is of absolute necessity to use the same common language 
by all stakeholders. Consumers are “locked in” and cannot switch to a competitor 
even if it provides superior technology.  As a commentator pointed out, the interest of 
consumers in IMS Health did not consist in getting a new product, but in having a 
larger number of competing suppliers in the market who offer comparable service 
using the same brick structure. 71  In standardization context, competition on the 
market depends on the ability of firm to offer the standardized product, moreover the 
access to the product market largely depend on having access to the IPRs that overlap 
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70 Case T-201/04, Microsoft v. Commission, September 17, 2007, para. 334. 
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with standard. 72  It has to be admitted that the new product requirement is 
inappropriate to address the problem of access to a standard. 
4.3.2. Dynamic efficiency consideration  
From protecting consumer interest perspective, most of anti-competition conduct 
could raise the price and/or limit the output, therefore prejudice consumer interests in 
the end. Granting a compulsory license of IPRs may produce an instant result—more 
competitors enter the market, the output increases, and the price goes down. However, 
such consumer-benefit results due to the fact that those new entrants did not bear the 
R&D risk and costs. It would harm the incentive for the dominant firm and its 
competitors to invest in innovation thereby impairing dynamic efficiency in the long 
run. Thus, in assessing the effect of anti-competition conducts, the test has to focus on 
long-term effect and its impact on innovation, which is intellectual property regime 
aims to promote. Most importantly, inter alia, the test should also rely on 
complementary interaction between intellectual property law and competition law.  
The goal of both intellectual property and competition law is to maximize allocative 
efficiency (making product cheaper and with the fewest recourses) and dynamic 
efficiency (making superior products). Intellectual property law generates incentive 
for innovation, to promote the development of superior products and services by inter 
alia forcing the right holder’s competitors to offer substitute products. 73 Competition 
law aims at maintaining competition in the market and ensures that firms feel pressure 
to innovate.74 They are complementary efforts to promote an efficient marketplace 
and long-run dynamic competition through innovation.75 The dynamic competition 
can also be referred to as competition by substitution. 76  In German Standard-
spundfass case, any drums that were not in compliance with the VCI standard were 
impossible to sell in German market. However, to manufacture the drums to meet 
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VCI standards, it was necessary to infringe on the disputed patent. In its judgment, 
German Federal Supreme Court clearly states the complementary interaction between 
intellectual property law and competition law. It notated that “the effect of an 
intellectual property right lies precisely in the power of the proprietor to exclude 
others from the use of the protected subject-matter. This exclusivity is not an 
exemption from competition, but an instrument of it that compels the proprietor’s 
competitors to compete by substitution as opposed to imitation.”77 
On this ground, scholars proposed a new approach in dealing with the refusal to 
license IPR problem: whenever competition by substitution is excluded as a matter of 
the market conditions, imitation may be allowed; based on the application of Article 
82 EC, the exceptional circumstances stated in AB Volvo might exist even if a 
competitor would not offer a new product to consumers, 78 —actually in 
standardization context usually it is impossible to offer a new product. 
The competition by substitution approach correctly reflects the complementary 
interaction between the IPR regime and competition law. It can effectively address the 
dilemma that the new product requirement has confronted in standardization context. 
Nevertheless, in applying this approach, IPR owners’ legitimate interests have to be 
considered sufficiently, as is demonstrated in the following section.   
4.3.3. Legitimate exercising IPR consideration 
Were IPRs exercised in normal way, it should not cause that competition by 
substitution is obstructed; or even though obstructing takes place, it could be tolerated 
in a limited period since IPRs are limited in scope, duration, and effect, which have 
been designed to balance the side effect of the exercising of IPRs. However, the 
exercising of IPRs has a tendency to exceed the boundary that the intellectual 
property regime aims to protect, thereof distort or reduce competition in the market. 
In that case, competition law can be activated to response because competition law is 
“concerned not with the legitimate exercise of an IP right granted by the government, 
but with efforts to expand the scope of that right, either to new products, or 
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temporally, or by conditioning access to the right on restrictions of competition”.79 As 
discussed in section 2, combined with a technical standard, an intellectual property 
may get extra value that is well in excess of the technology’s intrinsic value. When 
the exercising of IPR exceed its reasonable scope, therefore distort competition in the 
market, a restraint should take place to restore the market order. Competition law is 
such an effective tool to confine the exercise of IPR to a reasonable level.  
There is a view that IPR do not serve the goal of guaranteeing profit for investment in 
innovation, therefore, once the competition by substitution is blocked, the compulsory 
license (the competition by imitation) should take place. It is true that IPR do not 
serve the goal of guaranteeing profit for investment in innovation. However, what 
firms who have invested heavily on innovation expected was, when they made such 
investment, that their creative works, patentable inventions shall receive intellectual 
property protection once they are successful. IPR regime does not guarantee 
recouping the investment, but at least it should guarantee IPR owners legitimate 
exercising IPRs—whether such exercising activities can make enough profit to recoup 
their investment however is irrelevant. Therefore, only the fact that competition by 
substitution is blocked by a refusal to license IPR is not sufficient to trigger 
compulsory licensing IPR because it can damage legal certainty and the reasonable 
expectation of technology developers and IPR holders. Without assessing the 
underlying reason that results in competition by substitution blocked, a technology 
may end up in a situation where more innovative it is, more likely it is to be granted a 
compulsory license because it would be technically indispensable for competitors to 
carry on their businesses. 
In justifying compulsory license of an IPR, that competition by substitution is blocked 
must have involved over-exploiting IPR, in other words, the exercising of IPR has 
exceeded the scope that the intellectual property regime aimed to protect, in which the 
competition law is needed to intervene. The facts in these cases concerning refusal to 
license IPRs in EU strongly support this point, for example, in Magill, the IP is sole-
source copyright which was hold-up thereby block using information (the content 
rather than the expression); in IMS Health, the copyrights were combined with a 
dominant industry standard, thereby excluding any competition in the market; in 
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Microsoft, the interoperability information of PC operating system was leveraged into 
adjacent market (workgroup server operating system market), thereby excluding 
competitors; in Standard-spundfass, the patent was combined with a dominant 
industry standard, also it involved discrimination. Since the scope of exercising IPRs 
is not static rather it is dynamic, the IPR regime itself—for example the fair use, the 
exception to intellectual property, exhaustion and the term of protection etc.—
sometimes fails to confine a reasonable scope for the exercising of IPR, in that case, 
competition law can serve to define the scope of legitimate exercising IPRs. Therefore, 
over-exploiting IPRs which give rise to anti-competition effect has to be taken into 
account when determining the existence of abuse. If technological superior is the only 
reason why competitors cannot compete with IPR owner, the abuse should not be 
found. In term of standardization, the combination of intellectual property with a 
dominant industry standard, by which private property and common goods overlap 
and interact, may raise the potential for IPR owners to leverage industry standard 
through IPR hold-up or IPR ambush, thereby overexploiting IPRs.80   
Another advantage of taking into account the over-exploiting IPRs is that it can 
provide a chance to assess cases based on analyzing concrete IPRs individually. As 
Judge Laddie indicated in Philip v Ingman, “not all intellectual property rights are 
equal. Some are more equal than others. It is convenient and conventional to treat 
copyright, designs, topography rights, moral rights, confidential information, patents 
and trademarks as a group. But there are substantial differences between them. They 
last for different periods in respect of different types of subject-matter. They are 
infringed by different types of activity. They are subject to different types of defences 
or exceptions. For example, the fair use defences in copyright law have no equivalent 
in patent law and the compulsory licence provisions in patent law have no equivalent 
in copyright law. In Magill what was being considered was the rights in a subspecies 
of copyright. It does not follow inevitably that Magill can be applied by analogy to a 
patent case.”81 
4.4. No objective justification 
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Assessing whether objective justification exits is a useful instrument that enables 
courts to re-assess the balance of static efficiency and dynamic efficiency in terms of 
granting compulsory license of IPR. 
The Commission’s Guidance states that it will consider the dominant firm’s 
investment to determine efficiency as a ground of objective justification.82 However, 
because the compulsory license does not have to be a free license,83 the dominant firm 
still have chance to get revenue from compulsory license to recoup its investment on 
the intellectual property. Considering this, the investment of the dominant firm does 
not have to be a major factor to decide whether the exceptional circumstances exist; 
instead, it may be considered for determining the royalty level rather than determining 
the existence of the exceptional circumstances. The objective justification should 
focus on the assessment of static efficiency and dynamic efficiency in the long run, 
thereby creating an exception to the exceptional circumstances.  
5. Conclusion 
This article has examined the newly development of legal practice concerning refusal 
to license IPRs under Article 82 EC in light of standardization context, and finds 
current approach mainly formulated in Magill and IMS Health is insufficient to 
address refusal to license IPRs thereby blocking access to a industry common 
standard. The reason consists in its mixture of refusal to license IPRs and refusal to 
supply tangible goods without considering the intrinsic characteristic of intellectual 
property regime.  
Intellectual property regime was created to induce incentive to innovation, which 
differs from the characteristic of tangible goods. Therefore, the approach to address 
refusal to license IPR does not have to follow the precedents concerning refusal to 
supply tangible goods. An economic approach that focuses on the intrinsic 
characteristics of intellectual property and the complementary interaction between the 
intellectual property regime and competition law may deal with the problem in right 
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direction. In the meantime, to protect IPR proprietors’ reasonable expectation—
getting legitimate protection for their intellectual achievements rather than 
“guaranteeing profit for investment in innovation”, the exercising IPRs in reasonable 
scope should be respected. 
In Microsoft, the CFI endorsed the Commission’s finding that the circumstances 
identified in Magill and IMS Health did not establish an exhaustive list of exceptional 
circumstances.84 The Court referred to Article 82(b) EC, and noted that the limitation 
of technical development may constitute a parameter insofar as to prejudice 
consumers. Clearly the “exceptional circumstances” test has wider parameters than 
the “new product” rule as set out in Magill and IMS health. Once the “new product” 
approach is regarded as only one example of the exceptional circumstances, there are 
opening to adopt other conditions, to determine the existence of abuse.  
In view of the complex patent situation in the ICT industry, namely the intensive 
patenting and considerable potential of patent ambush and patent hold-up, a stringent 
abusive scrutiny which focus on the intrinsic characteristics of intellectual property 
and the complementary interaction between intellectual property regime and 
competition law may not only promote the dynamic efficiency, but also can facilitate 
the dissemination of technology, as dominant firms may be much readily to negotiate 
licensing with others considering the deterrence of abusive scrutiny. All stakeholders 
in the industry may somehow benefit from this, especially nowadays the ICT have 
already penetrated in every industry.85 
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